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Raymond Koen 
 
Abstract 
This essay explores the relationship between postmodernism and RJ. 
Postmodernism quickly outgrew its non-legal origins and has extended its 
reach to incorporate matters legal. Already, it has established a significant 
presence in the law, as increasing numbers of legal theorists have adopted or 
included a postmodern perspective in their analytical endeavours. The 
particular concern of the essay is with the impact of postmodernism upon the 
field of criminal justice. In this connection, it is submitted that RJ is the 
exemplification of the postmodern attitude in criminal justice. This submission 
is grounded in an investigation of the interrelations between postmodernism 
and RJ in six spheres, namely, the state, history, alterity, power, subjectivity 
and consumerism. This investigation shows that in each sphere there is a 
discernible and compelling postmodern flavour to the RJ tenet in question. In 
consequence, it is posited that the intersection between postmodernism and RJ 
is significant enough to justify the proposition that if there is a postmodern 
criminal justice it is RJ. In other words, RJ is postmodern justice. However, the 
relationship between postmodernism and RJ is steeped in contradiction. The 
latter part of the essay seeks to probe this contradiction, via an exposition and 
critique of the political economies of postmodernism and RJ, with a view to 
comprehending its implications for the future of RJ. 
1 Introduction 
Postmodernism is predatory. It long has superseded its origins in art, 
architecture and literary theory, and has wended its way voraciously through a 
large number of disciplines. It has conquered even the famously conservative 
defences of the law and already has made a noticeable imprint upon the 
analysis of legal relations. Indeed, it has implanted a colonising footprint in the 
legal form. There are today not a few legal academics who challenge the 
perceived certainties of legal modernism and who routinely subject law and 
justice to subversive interrogations through the postmodern lens.1 
The postmodern invasion of the law extends also to the field of criminal 
justice, where resort is had to the postulates of postmodernism in the 
comprehension and critique of crime and punishment. Restorative justice (RJ) 
                                           
1 See, generally, Edgeworth (2003), Davies (1996), McVeigh (2002), Hunt (1990), Stacy 
(2001) and Feldman (2000). 
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figures prominently here in that it encapsulates the postmodern offensive 
against the criminal justice system.2 Indeed, it is a central proposition of this 
essay that the notion of RJ is the exemplar of legal postmodernism in the arena 
of criminal justice. In other words, if there is a postmodern criminal justice, it is 
RJ.3 
There is a palpable correspondence between postmodernism and RJ, in that 
many of the major tenets of RJ have a discernibly postmodern flavour about 
them. The synchronicity between the two is neither episodic nor accidental. It is 
genetic. In this regard, RJ may be understood as one of the many progeny of 
postmodernism. There is enough constitutional intersection between them to 
justify RJ being theorised as a genus of postmodern justice, that is, as a form of 
criminal justice informed by the premises of a postmodern jurisprudence. The 
overall purpose of this essay, then, is to develop a critical comprehension of RJ 
as a postmodern presence in the criminal justice system. To this end, the first 
half of the essay is exegetical and seeks to establish the postmodern character of 
RJ, while the second is critical and attempts to elaborate a materialist critique of 
RJ as postmodern justice. 
2 The Postmodern Impulse of Restorative Justice 
The notion that RJ is constitutionally postmodern likely is a novel one for most 
of its advocates. As a rule, the proponents of RJ have little or nothing to say 
about postmodernism. Certainly, they do not confess readily to postmodern 
sensibilities, and still less do they identify expressly any postmodern 
provenance for their work. The literature of RJ is remarkable for displaying no 
wilful adherence to or conscious concurrence with the philosophical premises 
or operational axioms of postmodernism. 
Arrigo has taken up the theoretical cudgels for a reciprocal engagement 
between postmodernism and RJ, bemoaning the apparent distance of RJ 
                                           
2 See, for example, Edgeworth (2003) and Cunneen (2003). 
3 There are two versions of restorative justice. Comprehensive restorative justice is the 
strong or maximalist version, conceived as a systemic alternative to criminal justice. The 
weak or minimalist version is partial restorative justice, which is content to be an adjunct 
to criminal justice. The former is abolitionist, the latter accommodationist. The partial 
version of restorative justice holds negligible philosophical attraction and is of minimal 
theoretical consequence. It is little more than a pragmatic adaptation to the contradiction 
between criminal justice and comprehensive restorative justice. Comprehensive 
restorative justice is engaging analytically precisely because it entails a radical rejection 
of what is. Partial restorative justice is not, precisely because it seeks a modus vivendi with 
what is. It therefore does not demand sustained analytical attention. In any event, it 
makes sense only in its relation of incompleteness to comprehensive restorative justice. 
In this essay, then, any unqualified reference to restorative justice means comprehensive 
restorative justice. See further Pavlich (2005) 16-20. 
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principles from postmodern social theory.4 He canvasses the challenges which 
postmodernism poses for RJ, and urges that the ‚tools of affirmative 
postmodernism‛ be harnessed as a ‚liberating blueprint for reform in RJ‛.5 For 
him, RJ is the poorer for not embracing postmodernism and he considers that it 
is high time that its advocates begin to ‚apply postmodern principles to the 
logic and practice of restorative and community justice‛.6 In a word, he entreats 
adherents and practitioners of RJ to become affirmative postmodernists, the 
better to advance their pursuit of a justice system which is responsive alike to 
the needs of victims, offenders and their communities. 
Arrigo’s concerns may carry weight insofar as members of the RJ movement 
generally do not style themselves affirmative postmodernists or do not profess 
reliance upon the resources of postmodernism. However, the fact that they do 
not proclaim adherence to ‚postmodern principles‛ in itself is not an obstacle 
to the argument of this essay, that RJ is a thoroughly postmodern way of doing 
justice. As intimated above, and as will be demonstrated below, there is a 
constitutional coincidence between RJ and postmodernism which exists 
independently of the ideational preferences of their adherents. In this regard, 
Arrigo’s concerns are misplaced, for the practice of RJ already is decidedly 
postmodern, and the proponents of RJ need not be exhorted now to apply 
principles which already are inscribed, more or less, in their practice. In other 
words, RJ is postmodern in objective terms, notwithstanding the apparent 
unconcern of its followers with things postmodern. 
It bears noting here that Armstrong makes a similar argument in his 
treatment of the drug courts in the USA as dispensers of postmodern justice. 
According to him, the drug court is almost instinctively postmodern in its 
ontological disposition and diversionary practice, breaking radically with the 
punitive propensities of the modern criminal court. 
[I]t appears to me that the DC is postmodern because it combines ideas strongly 
influenced, perhaps even shaped, by postmodernism. The DC is not postmodern 
by design, its prime movers are not adhering to any preconceived intellectual or 
philosophical tradition. Instead the DC is a developing institution whose 
creators add components and adapt features based on first-hand consideration 
of the problem at hand. This, it turns out, is exactly what individuals engaged in 
the postmodern project do when they challenge adherence to universally 
applicable frameworks of interpretation.7 
                                           
4 See Arrigo (2008) 477-480 and Arrigo (2004) 93-98. 
5 Arrigo (2008) 481. 
6 Arrigo (2004) 98. 
7 Armstrong (2008) 272. 
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RJ is postmodern in much the same sense. It, too, departs radically from the 
mores of conventional criminal justice and comprehends the problems of crime 
and punishment from a postmodern perspective. But its postmodernism, too, is 
not espoused consciously or has not been developed deliberately by its 
adherents. Rather, it is a spontaneous postmodernism, which has emerged 
from their attempts to fashion an alternative to criminal justice. Like the drug 
court, RJ is extemporaneously postmodern. Not unlike Topsy, nobody never 
made its postmodernism, it just grow’d! 
3 Methodological Excursus 
It is necessary, at this juncture, to make some effort to forestall 
misinterpretation of the methodological conspectus of this essay. Patently, the 
analysis presented here entails a considerable degree of simplification, in 
respect of both postmodernism and RJ. And certainly, it is unable to do 
representational justice to the complexities and nuances which render 
postmodernism the proverbial moving target. However, all analytical 
endeavours, by definition, are exercises in simplification.8 It is not possible to 
analyse postmodernism or RJ or the relationship between them without 
simplifying their constitutional totalities. Wholeness must yield to partialness 
in the process of analysis. ‚Pigeon-holing‛ is unavoidable in the pursuit of 
comprehension.9 
Simplification, in turn, always and necessarily involves the analyst in a 
process of abstraction.10 A social form or a concept cannot be theorised without 
abstraction, that is, ‚the intellectual activity of breaking *the+ whole down into 
the mental units with which we think about it‛.11 The process of abstraction 
isolates and purifies the relations chosen for analysis, and reduces them to 
‚certain standard types, from which all characteristics irrelevant to the relation 
under examination are removed‛.12 It is about avoiding periphera and 
highlighting essentialia in the pursuit of analytical clarity. The point, as Hegel 
put it, is for ‚the essential to be distinguished and brought in to relief in 
contrast with the so-called non-essential‛.13 
The methodology which informs this essay is grounded in the process of 
abstraction. The objective was to get to the heart of the relationship between 
postmodernism and RJ. The six issues isolated for analysis were identified by 
abstracting them from the complex matrices of postmodernism and RJ. They 
                                           
8 See Ollman (1993) 24. 
9 See Mouton & Marais (1994) 58 & 126. 
10 Marx (1954) 19. 
11 Ollman (1993) 24. 
12 Sweezy (1942) 17. 
13 Hegel (1956) 65. 
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emerged from the process of abstraction as the locus for comprehending the 
relationship between RJ and postmodernism.14 
It may be owned, readily, that the analysis undertaken here is susceptible to 
a charge of failing to apprehend the constitutional complexities of its objects. 
This is especially so in respect of the oftentimes knotty intricacies of the 
postmodern worldview, marked by an antipathy to essentialism, truth-talk and 
metanarratives, and a commitment to indeterminacy, dislocation and 
eclecticism. However, as Eagleton has observed, ‚postmodernism is such a 
portmanteau phenomenon that anything you assert of one piece of it is almost 
bound to be untrue of another‛.15 The focus of this essay is thus upon the 
‚received wisdom‛ of postmodernism,16 that is, upon those fundamentals of 
the postmodern ontology by which we are able to recognise a phenomenon or a 
perspective as postmodern.17 It is submitted that the six precepts around which 
this essay revolves constitute a part, at least, of the ‚received wisdom‛ of 
postmodernism. 
The discussion which follows engages only those aspects of postmodernism 
which seem pertinent to the analysis of RJ as a postmodern way of doing 
justice. Thus, those aspects of postmodernism are singled out for analysis 
which appear to be most helpful in tracing the intersections between 
postmodernism and RJ. They have been chosen, not because they delineate or 
even approximate the structure of postmodernism or of RJ, but because they 
facilitate analytical access to the relationship between the two. That is, they 
offer crucial insights into the comprehension of RJ as a postmodern 
jurisprudence. The primary objective of this essay is to apprehend the contours 
of the relationship between RJ and postmodernism. It is submitted that the 
methodology adopted facilitates analytical access to that relationship in its 
pristine form, unencumbered by disposables and digressions. 
Finally, it has to be recorded that for the purposes of this essay 
postmodernism is taken to be the worldview that corresponds to 
postmodernity, and that postmodernity is the political economy of the current 
epoch, which began in the early 1970s, of the capitalist mode of production. As 
                                           
14 They are identified and analysed below. 
15 Eagleton (1996) viii. 
16 Eagleton (1996) viii. 
17 See Callinicos (1995) 734 who, some time ago already, classified postmodernism as a 
‚normal science‛, following the Kuhnian designation of ‚normal science‛ as ‚the state of 
affairs which comes into being when a group of researchers come to accept certain ways 
of proceeding intellectually as the basis of their future inquiries‛. He goes on to suggest 
that the ‚principal claims‛ of postmodernism have acquired ‚the solemn countenance of 
orthodoxy‛ for a goodly number of intellectuals. It would appear that, nuances and 
differences notwithstanding, there does exist an identifiable corpus of postmodern 
postulates which constitutes a ‚received wisdom‛. 
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a mode of production, capitalism is in historic decline. It is in the grip of a 
structural crisis of capital accumulation which goes to the vital issue of its 
reproduction as a mode of production. Postmodernism, then, is the intellectual 
disposition and cultural mood accompanying the contemporary stage of the 
capitalist crisis. It is the economic crisis expressed in non-economic terms. It is 
the generalised superstructural conjugate of the material contradictions 
embedded in the marrow of the capitalist mode of production. 
4 Mapping the Constitutional Concordance 
The next several sections of this essay comprise a presentation of a sestet of 
theses pertaining to the state, history, alterity, power, subjectivity and 
consumerism. It is submitted that these six theses are germane to the 
comprehension of RJ as a postmodern critique of the modern sensibilities 
founding the criminal justice system. In other words, they have been chosen 
because they appear to be most apposite for mapping the intersections between 
RJ and postmodernism and for facilitating analytical admission to the 
relationship between the two. 
The analysis of each of the designated theses will traverse two stages: 
firstly, an exposition will be offered of the basic postmodern viewpoint on the 
issue in question, in contrast to the modern viewpoint; secondly, an enquiry 
will be undertaken into the extent to which RJ shares the postmodern 
position.18 However, it must be urged that the discussion which follows cannot 
and does not purport to be comprehensive. Certainly, it is not presented as any 
finished description of RJ, and even less as any catholic elaboration of the 
constitution of postmodernism. The aim is much more pedestrian, namely, to 
provide a prolegomenon to the analysis of RJ as postmodern justice. 
4.1 The State Thesis 
Postmodernism posits the decline of the nation-state in the era of globalisation. 
The argument is that postmodernity is the epoch of the global market, peopled 
by autonomous subjects, with little or no room for the strong state of 
modernity. The point is underscored by Edgeworth’s characterisation of the 
postmodern state as a contracting state.19 This characterisation has a dual 
                                           
18 It is appropriate to note here that postmodernism is discursively hyperbolic. Extravagant 
notions such as hyperreality, pastiche, hyperspace and simulacrum are all integral to 
postmodern discourse. And postmodernists present their arguments in similarly 
exaggerated terms. See, in this regard, Best & Kellner (2001) 1-2 and Rosenau (1992) 5 & 
7. Generally, it is not possible to engage postmodernism, in any of its aspects or relations, 
without having recourse to and replicating some of its discursive conventions. If, 
therefore, parts of the presentation below strike the reader as hyperbolic, it is because 
hyperbole is intrinsic to the discourse of postmodernism. 
19 Edgeworth (2003) 53-63. 
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import. On the one hand, it refers to the retreat of the state as a public 
institution and the diminution of its traditional hegemonic role in structuring 
the lives of its citizens. On the other hand, it signifies the increasing 
privatisation of public functions, as the law of contract is relied upon more and 
more in respect of both the provision of (whatever remains of) state services 
and the internal functioning of state departments. Essentially, the postmodern 
state has reversed the modern trend to centralisation and corporatism. It is a 
state for which, according to Edgeworth, ‚privatisation, deregulation and 
marketisation are the preferred mechanisms by which governance is 
secured‛.20 
The welfare state was the pinnacle of the evolution of the modern state. It 
was centralisation and regulation epitomised, and, from the postmodern 
perspective, was the left liberal political metanarrative materialised. The 
postmodern state is defined by the neoliberal disavowal of the perceived 
welfarist errantry of left liberalism. The watchwords of neoliberalism are the 
self-same trilogy identified by Edgeworth as the preferred mechanisms of 
postmodern governance.21 In other words, postmodernism champions the 
neoliberal drive towards the attenuation of all the welfare functions of the 
modern state. Postmodernism prefers the invisible hand of the free market to 
the visible hand of the centralised state. Ideally, the postmodern state is an 
absentee state or, at best, a minimalist one, divested of many of its traditional 
functions, which become privatised in the hands of capitalist corporations.22 
The vision of the state held by postmodernism coincides with its rejection of 
the notion of the grand narrative which it considers to be the defining flaw of 
modernism. In this connection, the modern nation-state is perhaps the grandest 
of all narratives. It is a cohesive, centralised and authoritative institution, which 
is uniquely competent to implement and realise its own truth claims. It is 
omnipotent and, for as long as it enjoys a monopoly of force, is impervious to 
                                           
20 Edgeworth (2003) 56. 
21 But see MacEwan (1999) 19: ‚Markets are always infused with state actions, and the neo-
liberal position is not in reality an advocacy of a weak state; it is an advocacy of a 
particular kind of strong state.‛ For an amplification of this argument, see MacEwan 
(1999) 125-139. 
22 Postmodernists tend not to notice that the minimalist state which they extol is often party 
to the commodification of properly public functions, and that such commodification is 
achieved at the cost of increased immiseration of the oppressed and exploited classes. It 
would appear that for them the freedom of the individual which such a state supposedly 
brings is valuable enough to offset the deleterious impact upon the living standards of 
the masses. Postmodernism is a profoundly individualistic worldview. The autonomy of 
the subject is a centrepiece of the postmodern project (in much the same way as it was 
the centrepiece of the modern project). The freedom of the individual which accompanies 
privatisation is crucial. Its impact upon the living standards of the masses matters little. 
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the claims of competitors within its national borders. Postmodernism entails 
the break-up of the modern notion of state supremacy. State power becomes 
fragmented and localised, and state authority, like everything else in the 
postmodern world, becomes negotiable. The status of the state, as narrative, is 
reduced from the grand to the quotidian. In the postmodern perspective, most, 
if not all, traditional state functions can be performed as well, if not better, by 
non-state actors. 
RJ shares this postmodern vision of a minimalist or absentee state. Indeed, 
easily the most conspicuous property of comprehensive RJ is its militant anti-
statism. Its project to replace criminal justice with RJ is simultaneously a bid to 
eject the state from all matters criminal. In its search for a solution to the crime 
problem, RJ considers the state to be a hindrance which must be removed. The 
proponents of comprehensive RJ are, in this regard, all decidedly postmodern 
in their pursuit of a fully privatised system of criminal justice. The same is true, 
mutatis mutandis, of partial RJ. Although its proponents have reconciled 
themselves to the continued supremacy of state criminal justice, they too 
advocate the withdrawal of the state from those areas of the criminal justice 
system into which RJ may be admitted. Both versions of RJ thus embrace the 
postmodern argument for a minimalist or absentee state. Both believe that non-
state actors are capable of solving, in whole or in part, the problem of 
criminality upon which the efforts of state agencies hitherto appear to have 
made little impact. 
The intersection between postmodernism and RJ on the question of the state 
is extensive. Essentially, they are at one in their critique of the modern state in 
that both want an end of the state as the decisive authority and as the political 
metanarrative. The anti-statism of RJ mirrors the postmodern assault upon the 
intrusive character of the modern state. Both the postmodernist and the 
adherent of RJ advocate privatised relations to replace the current state forms. 
The RJ critique of the state thus is infused thoroughly with the ethos of 
postmodernism. 
4.2 The History Thesis 
Postmodernists readily trawl the past for both inspiration and ammunition in 
their battle against the configurations of modernism. In the result, historical 
references bulk large in the postmodern rejection of the perceived tyranny of 
the metanarrative. While such references are most evident in postmodern 
architecture and art, they form an integral facet of the postmodern project in 
most disciplines.23 Indeed, it has been argued that postmodernism has 
                                           
23 See Heartney (2001) 12 & 20 and Hutcheon (1988) 93. 
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embraced a ‚return to history‛ and appreciates the ontological value of 
historical consciousness.24 
Postmodern historicism is concerned primarily with excavating premodern 
social artefacts and organisational forms which may be enlisted in the crusade 
against the supposedly totalising machinations of modernism.25 
Postmodernists, following Lyotard, generally comprehend the premodern 
epoch in narrative terms, as opposed to the modern metanarrative.26 The 
narrative model of knowledge accepts no fixed origin which structures the 
narrative, and refuses to grant the narrator autonomy from the narrative. It is a 
model which presumes narrator heteronomy and which values epistemological 
contingency.27 
The postmodern commitment to the narrative tradition translates into a 
fascination with tribalism and localism as historical constructs. It is, more or 
less, already a postmodern conventional wisdom to endorse the narrative 
devices of tribal societies which survive on the fringes of the contemporary 
capitalist world in Latin America, Africa and Asia. These societies are 
prehistoric in organisation and technics, and supposedly are free of the 
metanarrative immoderations of the modern epoch.28 This is why, for example, 
arguments for a postmodern re-organisation of society invariably rely heavily 
upon notions of independent crafts, cottage industries, parochial economies 
and yeoman democracy.29 The idea is to exorcise the demons of modernism 
and rejuvenate the perceived idyll of premodern community.30 
                                           
24 Hutcheon (1988) 91-94. 
25 Of course, the postmodern recourse to premodern principles and concepts is a highly 
selective one. Invariably, the contradictions of the premodern world are avoided. The 
premodern epoch is wide. It spans both prehistoric and historical societies and includes 
at least two historical modes of production, namely, slavery and feudalism. The cultural 
and other achievements of the ancients were based on slave labour. The attractions of 
localism and community harmony omit the feudal structures of exploitation and 
oppression which dominated the day-to-day existences of serfs and peasants. 
26 Lyotard (1991) xxiv famously pronounced that: ‚Simplifying to the extreme, I define 
postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.‛ See also Edgeworth (2003) 234. 
27 Davies (1996) 68-70. 
28 The postmodern faith in a prehistoric world free of the metanarrative is unsubstantiated. 
Custom was the grand narrative of the prehistoric world. See Seagle (1946) 33: ‚The great 
reality of primitive society is not ‘civil’ law or ‘criminal’ law, but custom.‛ The savage 
horde and the barbarian gens were totalising institutions to the core. Contemporary 
tribal societies survive not only because they are geographically excluded from the reach 
of the capitalist mode of production but also because they are structured by their own 
metanarratives, arguably even more totalising than those of modernism. 
29 See Kumar (1995) 48. This premodern historical bias is an inevitability, more or less. 
History offers only the choice between premodernism and modernism. Since 
postmodernism stands contrary to all that is modern, the only viable historical 
alternative is premodernism. If, therefore, postmodernism seeks to validate itself 
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Proponents of RJ share the postmodern predilection for premodern 
historical justifications. Indeed, RJ is perhaps more strident than 
postmodernism in its reliance upon history to advance its cause. The 
opposition between RJ and retributive justice has become firmly established as 
a RJ article of faith. Retribution is portrayed as a modern response to crime 
which has no or little foundation in the history of punishment. Adherents of RJ 
believe that the premodern world was, as regards penal sanctions, a world of 
RJ. Thus, Christie relies heavily upon the justice regime of premodern African 
tribes as the basis for his proprietary theory of RJ.31 Similarly, the republican 
theory of RJ espoused by Braithwaite & Pettit is rooted historically in the 
premodern Roman notions of libertas, civitas and dominium.32 Other RJ 
advocates such as Zehr and Consedine concur with the view that the 
premodern era was, more or less, a golden era of restoration in the history of 
criminal justice.33 
Supporters of RJ identify retribution with large-scale industrial society. In 
other words, they conceive of it as the penal regime of the modern capitalist 
world. But they are adamant that retributive justice is neither the natural nor 
the necessary response to the problem of criminality. For them, RJ is not only 
the aboriginal but also the more natural way of doing justice. It was the justice 
of preindustrial, tribal, small-scale societies and, as such, was the archetypal 
premodern form of justice. And it was successful in keeping the premodern 
world free of the kind of rampant criminality in which every modern society 
has been languishing for decades. As the paradigmatic modern approach to 
punishment, retribution allegedly has brought about its own demise by its 
signal failure to make any significant impact upon the contemporary crisis of 
criminality. Hence the argument for its replacement by RJ which, it is 
                                                                                                                           
historically, it is entirely logical that it should draw upon premodernism as its primary 
source of such validation. What is more, the premodern epoch has the added attraction 
of being more unequivocally past than the modern era. It is no longer a component of 
living memory and thereby is available readily for a postmodern makeover, literally. 
30 For a dissenting view, see Davis (1988) 83-84: ‚At least 100,000 apparel homeworkers toil 
within a few miles’ radius of the Bonaventure *the Los Angeles hotel which has become a 
postmodern icon] and child labour is again a shocking problem. This restructuring of the 
relations of production and the productive process is, to be sure, thoroughly capitalist, 
but it represents not some higher stage in capitalist production, but a return to a sort of 
primitive accumulation with the valorisation of capital occurring, in part, through the 
production of absolute surplus value by means of the super-exploitation of the urban 
proletariat.‛ 
31 Christie (1977) 2 et seq. 
32 Braithwaite & Pettit (1990) 9 et seq. 
33 Zehr (1995) 95-157 and Consedine (1999) 10-11 & 80-96. 
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contended, has become necessary because it alone possesses the radical vision 
required to resolve the crisis. 
If retribution is the apogee of the modern way of doing justice, then there 
can be little doubt that RJ is the prototypical postmodern approach to justice. It 
defines itself in terms of its opposition to retribution and considers itself to be 
imbued with the palliative and regenerative powers of its premodern 
pedigree.34 From the postmodern perspective, retributive justice is a version of 
the modern metanarrative whereas RJ is imbued with the spirit of the 
premodern narrative. And the key to overcoming the tyranny of the former is 
to revert to the freedom of the latter. RJ and postmodernism evidently are 
coeval in their partiality to the supposedly emancipatory promise of the 
premodern narrative. 
4.3 The Alterity Thesis 
Postmodernism has a preoccupation with alterity. It is a preoccupation which 
has resulted in the idea of the Other becoming acknowledged generally as 
being ‚crucial to any discussion of postmodernism‛.35 Such a focus upon 
alterity is concerned to engage and thereby to foreground the traditional 
outgroups which have been marginalised by the modern metanarrative. 
Women, people of colour, homosexuals, indigenous populations, the disabled 
and the aged: these are the Others, ostracised and silenced by modernism, with 
whom postmodernism has chosen to identify. A large part of the postmodern 
project is devoted to embracing and championing the claims of the outsider. It 
is about giving a voice to the narrative of every outgroup which hitherto has 
been reduced to ‚a sideshow in the grand narrative of world history‛ by the 
domination intrinsic in totalisation.36 The postmodern ideal is a world free of 
the modern bias against the Other, in which there is no longer any ontological 
difference between insider and outsider, and in which otherness has ceased to 
be a concept of marginality. 
The postmodern credo is one of perfect equality, in terms of which every 
perspective is accorded absolute validity. There is no room for either hierarchy 
or domination in the postmodern worldview. If the postmodern ideal comes to 
pass, we shall find ourselves, to mangle Marx, in a very Eden of the innate 
equality of narratives.37 Postmodernism is, in this connection, the self-
appointed saviour of the Other. If postmodernism is an emancipatory 
movement, then outsider emancipation is at the top of its agenda. There is 
                                           
34 See Pavlich (2005) 34-42 who provides a trenchant critique of the technicism of the 
medical model of crime and punishment embedded in the RJ perspective. 
35 Heartney (2001) 51. 
36 Heartney (2001) 65. 
37 See Marx (1954) 172. 
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nothing more quintessentially postmodern than the endeavour to find and 
legitimate the outgroup narrative. Therein, for many postmodernists, lies the 
true meaning of their project.38 
Postmodern jurisprudence, unsurprisingly, is populated heavily by schools 
of outsider jurisprudence. The engagement between postmodernism and the 
law is dominated by the jurisprudence of the traditional outgroups identified 
above.39 Such outsider jurisprudents typically present an alternative truth to 
that installed as modern law. They seek to secure for their constituencies the 
same substantive legal subjectivity which modernism had reserved for able-
bodied white heterosexual men.40 The jurisprudence of alterity desires to 
integrate outgroups into the concept of legal subjectivity, and thereby to 
construct a properly universal and neutral subject. It is, ultimately, about 
validating otherness by subverting the axiom of sameness which lies at the 
heart of the modern legal form. 
RJ may be understood as the outsider jurisprudence of the criminal justice 
system. Like postmodernism in general and postmodern jurisprudence in 
particular, it too is dedicated in a fundamental sense to the cause of the Other 
in the criminal justice system. The traditional outsider of criminal justice is, of 
course, the victim. Victimologists preceded the proponents of RJ in their 
advocacy of victims’ rights and their overall concern with improving the status 
of the victim in the criminal justice system. However, RJ has taken a far more 
radical approach and installed the victim at the epicentre of the restorative 
process.41 The victim is no longer someone who must be taken into account by 
those who manage the disposition of criminal conflicts. She is no longer 
someone to or for whom justice must be done. In the RJ programme, the victim 
is an agent of justice. She is transformed from outsider to insider and becomes 
an indispensable participant in the restorative process. Her otherness, 
originally a source of powerlessness, is transfigured into a source of power. She 
becomes a ‚stakeholder‛. RJ vindicates the narrative of the victim in the face of 
the metanarrative of the criminal justice system. 
The community is the other Other of the criminal justice system. It may be 
true that courts usually are enjoined to take into account the interests of the 
community when sanctioning a criminal offender. However, the determination 
of the interests of the community is seldom, if ever, made by the community 
                                           
38 See Harvey (1989) 47 who refers to the seduction of ‚the most liberative and therefore the 
most appealing aspect of postmodern thought – its concern with ‘otherness’‛. 
39 Feldman (2000) 158-159. 
40 Davies (1996) 70-74. 
41 Pavlich (2005) 44-48. 
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itself.42 The community has, in this sense, much the same outsider status as the 
victim in the criminal justice system. RJ aims to do for the community 
essentially what it hopes to do for the victim, that is, to bestow upon it the 
capacities of an agent of justice. 
The traditional insiders of the criminal justice system are the state, the legal 
professionals and the offender. RJ wants no truck with the first two.43 Of 
course, the offender remains crucial. However, he is now, along with the victim 
and the community, a member of a triumvirate of equals, through whom 
justice must be done. RJ, in this regard, is about reconciling a trilogy of 
narratives, none of which is authoritative. It is about finding a restorative 
sanction in the engagement of each agent with the truth-claims of the others. 
And it is about ensuring that the traditionally muted are given voice. That is a 
typically postmodern way of doing justice.44 
4.4 The Power Thesis 
Foucault’s position on power has acquired the exalted status of a postmodern 
presupposition.45 In accordance with its rejection of the grand narrative, 
postmodernism detaches power from its modern association with the state and 
the repressive and ideological state apparatuses. The state monopoly of power 
is denied, and the locus of power is dispersed throughout the social structure, 
from the apex of political power to the relations between individuals in a 
myriad of everyday power relations.46 In contrast to the centralised notion of 
power comprehended by modernism, postmodernism posits a multiplicity of 
                                           
42 It may be made by a magistrate or judge, who may or may not be assisted by lay 
assessors. Or it may be made by a jury. RJ does not consider either lay assessors or jurors 
to be adequately representative of the community. 
43 The ejectment of the state and legal professionals does not amount to the creation of new 
Others. It simply means that they are no longer pertinent to the justice process. Those 
who have no interest in the process are not outsiders in the sense used here. See Christie 
(1977) 2-5. 
44 The postmodern language of alterity has become part and parcel of the advocacy 
literature of restorative justice. RJ advocates routinely call for those ‚other‛ voices which 
have been silenced by the criminal justice system to be heard. See, for example, Toews & 
Zehr (2003) 262: ‚Maintaining the crime experience in the hand of experts contributes to 
othering and the creation of social distance between offenders, victims and the rest of 
society. The public is never permitted to encounter offenders and victims as multi-
dimensional individuals with personal stories and unique experiences. Instead, offenders 
as well as victims become stereotypes of the ‘other’. These others are often associated 
with ethnic groups and social classes different than the majority of society.‛ 
45 See Feldman (2000) 169-174 who notes that, in their analysis of power, ‚postmodern legal 
scholars follow Foucault‛. 
46 See Stacy (2001) 69: ‚For Foucault, power does not merely emanate clearly from 
identified political and legal domains, but can be found amorphously circulating 
everywhere in society.‛ 
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power relations which penetrates into every nook and cranny of our lives. 
Power, from this perspective, is primarily a local phenomenon. It becomes 
what Foucault refers to as a micro-physics of power.47 Given the perceived 
decline of the nation-state, it is the power configurations of non-state relations 
which matter most in the postmodern worldview. 
The Foucauldian perspective also implies that the postmodern self is, at 
bottom, a power construct. We do not precede the micro-physics of power. 
Instead, we emerge as ‚the meeting-point in the flows (or discourses) of 
power‛.48 We are a creation of the self-same power which operates upon us 
every day in a multitude of ways. In postmodern terms, the legal subject is 
‚intrinsically heteronomous, constituted by power‛.49 The juridical is, in this 
regard, the core notion of a paradigm in which legal subjectivity is the 
discursive effect of intersecting power plays. 
Its proponents do not comprehend RJ publicly as a site of power relations. 
To be sure, they are consistent critics of the criminal justice system as a matrix 
of centralised power. And, if they advocate comprehensive RJ, they also 
advocate the end of state power in all criminal matters. However, they tend to 
be silent on the question of power within the structure of the restorative 
process itself.50 Of course, such silence cannot conceal completely the fact that 
RJ is implicated as deeply in the connivances of power as the criminal justice 
which it maligns so routinely. 
The rejection of state-sponsored criminal justice suggests that, as a 
structure-in-power, RJ is sensible to the postmodern belief in the omnipresence 
of power in the constitution of social relations. To the extent that RJ is 
committed to a decentralised justice system, it is committed also to the 
parcellisation of adjudicatory and punitive power. Hence its advocacy of a 
restorative process which presumes a localised disposition regime. Criminal 
justice will no longer be state justice, visited upon offenders from on high. It 
will be neighbourhood justice, structured by the restorative process which 
embraces both victim and offender as empowered agents of justice. Each 
restorative community will become a separate locus of power. There will no 
longer be a metanarrative of power. It will be dispersed into a series of 
narratives in RJ locales. 
Whereas RJ comprehends centralised juridical power in relentlessly 
negative terms, its appreciation of the localised variant of such power generally 
                                           
47 Foucault (1977) 139. 
48 Kumar (1995) 131. 
49 Dews (1987) 161. 
50 This, of course, is to be expected. The connotations of power are predominantly negative, 
and no self-image is eager to admit of such negativities. 
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is positive.51 At the parochial level, power is considered to be a productive 
phenomenon which constitutes the victim and the community, and which 
reconstitutes the offender, as agents of the restorative process. It is an 
unspoken presumption of the RJ catechism that power relations within the 
restorative process will be fundamentally symmetrical, which will discourage 
or stymie efforts by any party to lord it over any other. The restorative process 
is supposed to be one of equalisation, not of domination.52 It would appear that 
the supporters of RJ need to believe that, in their case at least, the 
fragmentation of power entails a qualitative transformation in the composition 
of power, such that, at the neighbourhood level, it becomes an instrument of 
emancipation.53 At this level, then, power is a progressive heteronomy in the 
constitution of the legal subject. 
4.5 The Subjectivity Thesis 
Postmodernism comprehends the subject as a composite of a plurality of equal 
identities. It rejects the notion of the essential subject, rigorously defined and 
exactly delineated, which is at the centre of modernism. For the postmodernist, 
the subject is a social construct. Subjectivity is context bound and historically 
specific. There is no overarching pre-given subjectivity which delimits our 
person. We are created and re-created as subjects within the social milieu in 
which we find ourselves.54 All of us ‚live in many different worlds 
simultaneously‛.55 
                                           
51 Dews (1987) 161-162. 
52 Postmodernists generally have not given attention to the structural factors which militate 
against such equalisation. It would appear that their primary goal is to transform the 
criminal justice system from a centralised to a decentralised one. And whereas they have 
problematised criminal justice as state justice, they have presumed, naïvely, that the 
restorative process will render power relations at the local level unproblematic. 
53 It must be noted here that local power is potentially as dangerous as central power. Local 
power also tends to agglomeration in the same way as does central power. Local power 
is as susceptible of metanarrative pretensions as central power. Indeed, many local 
powers of disposition tend to come into existence as a version of central power. If such 
powers are a concession from the state, they are comprehended easily within the grand 
narrative of state power. In other words, there is nothing inherent in the dispersal of the 
power of disposition to regional or neighbourhood structures to suggest the dissipation 
of the tyranny of the grand narrative. 
54 See Feldman (2000) 174-176, Davies (1996) 73-74 and Stacy (2001) 11-12. 
55 Jamieson (1991) 583. As Wicke (1992) 11-21 points out, although the postmodern position 
on subjectivity entails a ‚deprecation of ‘identity’ in any form‛, postmodern politics 
remains ‚entirely identity-based‛. In other words, there is a basic contradiction between 
the postmodern assault upon the essentialism of the modern notion of identity and the 
postmodern embrace of identity-based outsider politics. See the discussion under the 
alterity thesis above. 
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Whereas modern subjectivity is centred, postmodernism proceeds from a 
decentred subjectivity. It is always in formation and is never a nucleus of 
sovereignty for the self.56 Feldman identifies two implications of postmodern 
subject decentredness. Firstly, the subject is not an autonomous site of power 
which is capable of directing the course of social development.57 Secondly, the 
subject does not possess an immutable centre upon which its elements may be 
elaborated or from which they may be extrapolated.58 Postmodern subjectivity 
is fragmented to the core. There is, in other words, no postmodern subject who 
has not been constituted from the asymmetries and incommensurables which 
make up social existence.59 
Postmodern jurisprudents transpose this idea of the social construction of 
subjectivity to their critique of the legal subject. The modern conception of the 
legal subject is singular and indivisible. Only those characteristics which 
qualify as juridical are factored into the constitution of the legal subject. Any 
other sources of subjectivity are discarded summarily. In other words, the law 
recognises only the legal subject. In the modern view, all non-legal derivations 
of subjectivity are considered trivial. Postmodern legal analysts are highly 
critical of this exclusionary proclivity of the modern conception of legal 
subjectivity.60 Their major aspiration in this regard is to have non-legal 
subjectivities acknowledged and accepted, alongside legal subjectivity, as 
indispensable to the construction of a truly just dispensation.61 
RJ is similarly impatient with the proscriptions and preclusions embedded 
in a strictly legal subjectivity. Indeed, the restorative process cannot 
accommodate the modern conception of the legal subject. It is a process which 
                                           
56 Wicke (1992) 17-20. 
57 Feldman (2000) 174. 
58 Feldman (2000) 175. 
59 See Stacy (2001) 12 and Jamieson (1991) 583. 
60 See Beger (2002) 187-188 who describes the modern conception of legal subjectivity in the 
following terms: ‚The legal arena cannot operate without the logic of identity, yet 
subjects of the law do not exist prior to their negotiation in the legal processes. The 
power of law lies in representing something as real, as the only possible representation of 
the real. So, while subjects in court rooms are real people, they can only ever be 
represented partially in their diversities. The legal subject can only present itself as subject 
in the discursive logic of the juridical. Other possible truths and realities exist, but the 
reality that can be heard by legal interpretation is hegemonic and dominant. Thus, the 
power of the law is its acclamation of one reality as the most true reality, the most 
important reality.‛ 
61 Postmodernism is keen to widen the ambit of the juridical. However, there is no evidence 
that it is willing to abandon the juridical as the defining element of legal subjectivity. It is 
one thing to incorporate features of the traditionally non-juridical into the composition of 
the juridical. It is another thing altogether to replace the juridical with the non-juridical. 
The radicality of postmodernism does not contemplate the latter. 
174         RAYMOND KOEN 
 
seeks to comprehend both victim and offender as more than mere legal 
subjects, as real people who lead complicated and unpredictable lives in 
disparate and contradictory conditions. Criminal justice reduces them to 
‚mere‛ legal subjects. RJ proposes a subjectivity which extends to all those 
other aspects of their lives which, albeit non-juridical, are pertinent to the 
construction of a properly restorative sanction.62 
The RJ rejection of the limitations of legal subjectivity emulates its rejection 
of a state presence in the restorative process. Ultimately, legal subjectivity is a 
state-guaranteed status. The absence of the state invariably has a disintegrative 
effect upon legal subjectivity, thereby allowing for the activation of non-legal 
sources of subjectivity in the restorative process. The anti-statism of RJ is, in 
this connection, crucial to exploding the formal bounds of legal subjectivity. 
Indeed, RJ cannot stay within the prescribed parameters of legal subjectivity 
without subverting itself and its goals. The legal subject is germane to criminal 
justice. The restorative process needs to take account of ‚the diversity of the 
human condition‛ if it is to be distinguishable at all from the criminal justice 
process.63 And the restorative sanction needs to be constructed according to 
realities which lie outside the ambit of legal subjectivity if it is not to be just 
another variant of state punishment. Again, RJ emerges as a decidedly 
postmodern way of doing justice. 
4.6 The Consumerism Thesis 
Sardar identifies consumerism as ‚the quintessential characteristic of the 
postmodern era‛.64 In the same vein, Jameson refers to postmodernism as a 
‚culture of consumption‛ which reproduces the ‚logic of consumer 
capitalism‛.65 There can be little serious discontent about this characterisation. 
If postmodernity can be reduced to any single condition, it has to be the 
complete triumph of consumerism. The postmodern subject is constituted, 
literally, by his ‚consumption of mass-produced objects and images‛.66 And the 
postmodern world is a hyperreality of representations of the universal 
consumer.67 It is a world in which: 
                                           
62 Compare the argument of Christie (1977) 9 for neighbourhood courts in which are 
considered ‚every detail regarding what happened – legally relevant or not‛. 
63 Stacy (2001) 12. 
64 Sardar (1998) 59-60. 
65 Jameson (1991) 206 and Jameson (1988) 29. 
66 Heartney (2001) 42. 
67 Khanom (2010) 62-63. 
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the department store [becomes] the cathedral of postmodern desire and the act of 
shopping [becomes] the postmodern version of democratic choice.68 
Postmodern society is, in a word, consumer society writ large. 
Consumerism is, of course, more than the drive to accumulate and consume 
mass-produced goods and images. It is also, and crucially, the triumphant 
materialisation of commodity fetishism. It is the high-water mark of exchange 
relations in an economy structured by generalised commodity production. The 
relations between postmodern subjects are constituted as relations between 
commodities, the accumulation of which becomes, so to speak, a consuming 
passion. In other words, consumerism entails the fetishisation of human 
relations. Postmodern subjectivity is consumerist to the extent that it is a 
commodified subjectivity.69 
Consumerism, then, is commodification unbridled. It is a culture which is 
distinguished by the commodification of everything.70 Everything is a 
commodity and the commodity is everything. The commodity is the elemental 
form of capitalist property and all commodity exchange relations are thus 
fundamentally proprietary in nature. In other words, the notion of 
consumerism is an essentially proprietary notion. The postmodern culture of 
consumption is the spirit of capitalist property made tangible, if somewhat 
rudely and gaudily. If rampant consumerism exemplifies postmodernism, then 
rampant commodification exemplifies postmodernity. And if the postmodern 
subject is first and foremost a consumer, then the postmodern consumer is first 
and foremost a proprietor. 
Postmodernism, then, is deeply complicitous in the reproduction of the 
property relations of capitalism. However, and in keeping with its quest for 
diversity and multiplicity, postmodernism is not committed to the 
conventionally private and unencumbered form of capitalist property. The 
postmodern conception of property is an expansive and a flexible one. And 
while it may accept that bourgeois property is primarily private, 
postmodernism does not accept that it has to be exclusively private. Indeed, it 
                                           
68 Heartney (2001) 47. 
69 Khanom (2010) 63. 
70 The following statement by Marx (1975) 34 is uncannily prescient of this aspect of 
postmodernism: ‚Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as 
inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the 
time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; 
given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, 
conscience, etc. - when everything finally passed into commerce. It is the time of general 
corruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time 
when everything, moral or physical, having become a marketable value, is brought to the 
market to be assessed at its truest value.‛ 
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urges that the private fundament be augmented by a social or public 
dimension, in terms of which private ownership is charged with collective 
duties and responsibilities. In other words, postmodernism seeks to dethrone 
the individualist and absolutist notion of proprietorship which typifies 
modernism. Such proprietorship is disapproved as totalising and tyrannical. 
The regime of private bourgeois property must therefore be detotalised, by 
confronting it with the sensibilities of public service and community obligation. 
The postmodern conception is thus one which comprehends a decentred 
proprietary regime structured by an engagement between private rights and 
public claims.71 
RJ may be considered a version of postmodern consumerism. This 
proposition, especially its conjoining of restorative doctrine with an unsavoury 
culture of consumption, likely will offend the bulk of RJ advocates. However, it 
is a proposition which is properly defensible. To be sure, RJ by no means 
displays or condones the excesses of wanton consumerism. But it is as deeply 
inculpated as such consumerism in the process of accelerated and generalised 
commodification which characterises the postmodern epoch. In other words, 
the difference between RJ and postmodern consumerism is a quantitative one, 
based on the extent to which the one is restrained and the other not. It is 
submitted that they are qualitatively akin in that they both embrace a 
foundational proprietary axiom. Both espouse property as their organising 
principle. 
The proprietary nature of consumerism is obvious and incontrovertible. 
Albeit not patently so, RJ, too, is a fundamentally proprietary concept. The idea 
that RJ is proprietary in nature was originated by Christie, who is the 
acknowledged doyen of RJ theory. In his 1976 Foundation Lecture of the 
Centre of Criminological Studies at the University of Sheffield, Christie 
proposed a theory of criminal justice which since has become the premier 
theory of RJ. The lecture, published under the title Conflicts as Property, is easily 
the most quoted single piece in the capacious corpus of RJ literature, and its 
arguments have become ‚a modern orthodoxy amongst RJ supporters‛.72 
                                           
71 See Feldman (2000) 167. Whereas it may wish to infiltrate alterity into the composition of 
capitalist property, postmodernism accords property as a socio-economic category the 
status of an irrebuttable presumption. In other words, it leaves intact the modern 
metanarrative of property. The postmodern insurrection against all things modern stops 
short of capitalist property relations. The postmodern project to subvert and decentre the 
elements of modernism has had no impact whatsoever upon the modern commitment to 
the sanctity of property. In the midst of the maelstrom of postmodern destabilisation, 
property survives unscathed as the most stable of capitalist categories. What is more, it 
has suffused postmodernism with its own ethos. 
72 Ashworth (2003) 171. See also Wright (1991) 54, Johnstone (2003) 24, Hudson (2003) 177 
and Bottoms (2003) 82 & 80 footnote 2. 
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The Christie thesis expressly conceives of crimes as forms of property. 
Every crime is the property of the offender and the victim, and every criminal 
conflict is resolved in consumption by its owners. RJ is, in this connection, the 
Christie thesis given flesh. Indeed, the very idea of restoration is an inherently 
proprietary idea. That which is restored to a person must have belonged to that 
person originally. Property is the natural object of restoration. Its natural 
subject is the owner. Restoration presumes the unlawful loss or deprivation of 
that which one is legally entitled to have. It is about making good the loss or 
deprivation, and returning that which was taken, usually by means foul. The 
goal is unambiguous: to re-unite the owner with his property or an equivalent 
replacement, and thereby to recover the status quo ante.73 
Property is entailed in restoration. It is the relationship between the owner 
and his property which has to be restored. That relationship has been 
disturbed, and has to be reinstated. What is more, the proprietary relationship 
is a natural one which has to be recovered.74 Thus, there is embedded in the 
notion of restoration an idea that a natural proprietary relationship has been 
rent, and that the aim of restoration is to repair that relationship. The premise is 
that a person has been deprived of something or access to something that is his 
or hers. The person may have a right of ownership in the thing or a right of 
possession. In either case, it is a proprietary right. And it is a taken-for-granted 
proprietary right. In other words, the relationship between the person and the 
thing is understood to be an organic one. Restoration is, in this regard, about 
re-establishing this relationship when it has been sundered unlawfully. It is 
about repairing what is considered to be normal and proper, namely, the 
fundamental proprietary relationship. 
The appropriation by RJ proponents of the Christie thesis as the theoretical 
fulcrum of their project has made patent the proprietary constitution of RJ. The 
proprietary postulate once identified, it becomes obvious that RJ shares the 
consumerist ethos of postmodernism. To be sure, RJ may share none of the 
                                           
73 The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary offers a definition of ‚restore‛ which includes the 
expressly proprietary ‚to return something lost or stolen to the rightful owner‛. The 
definition contained in the Oxford Universal Dictionary is equally, if not as patently, 
proprietary: ‚To give back, to make return or restitution of (anything previously taken 
away or lost)‛. 
74 Thus the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary adds that ‚restore‛ also means ‚to bring 
someone or something back to a normal or proper state or condition‛. The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary includes a similar definition of ‚restore‛: ‚replace, put back, bring to former 
place or condition‛. The established meaning of the nominal ‚restorative‛ as a health-
restoring agent reinforces the idea of a natural or normal relationship which requires 
repair. 
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extravagances usually associated with consumerism.75 But insofar as 
consumerism recasts human relations in proprietary terms, RJ is resolutely 
consumerist. 
The conception of property adhered to by RJ cements its affinity with 
postmodernism. Although Christie theorised crimes as forms of property, he 
did not comprehend them necessarily as forms of private property. The 
conventional notion of property in the capitalist world is that it is private and 
that its private nature entails the exclusion of all non-owners from asserting 
proprietary rights over it, or deriving advantage from it without the consent of 
the owner. Christie's property postulate does not accord with convention. He 
proposes a proprietary form which deviates from the private norm of 
capitalism, namely, common property. When Christie declares both that a 
criminal conflict is not private property and that it is the property of victim and 
offender, he is referring, it is submitted, to a species of capitalist property 
which is located outside the classically private, insofar as non-owners enjoy 
access to it and possess certain rights in it.76 Thereby, he is broadening the 
ambit of the capitalist property regime beyond its traditional parameters to 
include common property. But, importantly, it is a common property to the 
benefits of which individuals have enforceable claims. In other words, and in 
concurrence with the individualist catechism of the bourgeois world, it is a 
common property demarcated in terms of individual rights. For Christie, then, 
a criminal conflict is a form of common capitalist property in which all directly 
involved parties enjoy individual rights. 
Following Christie, the RJ position on property thus replicates the 
postmodern position in its willingness to decentre bourgeois property and 
theorise it in terms other than the traditionally private. Both positions 
foreground a form of property which usually exists only in the penumbra of 
the dominant form. And while such an approach may leave the dominant form 
intact, it does undermine the dominance hitherto enjoyed by modern attempts 
to resolve the crisis of criminality.77 
5 Restorative Justice is Postmodern Justice 
It is submitted that, en bloc, the six theses discussed above support the 
conclusion that RJ is the paradigmatic form of postmodern criminal justice. The 
analysis has shown that RJ replicates significantly the postulates of 
postmodernism in these six spheres. And the intersection is extensive enough 
                                           
75 The extravagances of restorative justice lie elsewhere, in the promises embedded in what 
Daly (2002) 70 refers to as ‚the exceptional or ‘nirvana’ story of repair and goodwill‛. 
76 Christie (1977) 8-12. 
77 Indeed, the modern conception must take a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility 
for precipitating the crisis. 
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to sustain and defend the proposition which comprehends RJ as the exemplar 
of postmodern justice. 
The postmodern character of RJ is perhaps most evident in its reliance upon 
narrative techniques to structure restorative conferences. In this area even the 
language of postmodernism has become integrated into the discourse of RJ. 
Participants in restorative conferences are encouraged to tell their own stories, 
to speak their truths, to highlight their individual experience of the crime and 
its consequences. The focus is upon the personal perspective, not the universal. 
Narrative is a ‚personalised approach‛ which does ‚not attempt to generalise 
or universalise‛.78 The aim always is to render visible and thereby meaningful 
the particularities of the criminal episode as apprehended by the parties to it. 
Van Ness & Strong make the point thus: 
At the [restorative] meeting, the parties talk to one another; they tell their stories. 
In their narrative they describe what happened to them and how that has 
affected them, and how they see the crime and its consequences. This is a 
subjective rather than objective account and, consequently, it has integrity both 
to the speaker and to the listener < Narrative permits the participants to express 
and address emotions.79 
This is classic postmodern multi-perspectivism, engendered directly by RJ’s 
rejection of the metanarrative of criminal justice.80 Similarly, Toews & Zehr 
posit that justice is not ‚a generalisable experience‛ and argue for ‚multiple 
perspectives on a crime event‛ and hence for ‚multiple interpretations of the 
same event‛.81 Other prominent RJ supporters also routinely incorporate 
restorative narratives into their work.82 In other words, they adopt a typically 
postmodern strategy in their pursuit of a RJ resolution to a criminal conflict. RJ, 
in this connection, is structured by the calculus of idiosyncrasy which is so 
pivotal a dimension of the postmodern project. 
It may be owned that, besides its penchant for narrator heteronomy, 
postmodern paraphernalia do not figure large in the self-image of RJ. However, 
that is no barrier to a legitimate designation of RJ as postmodern justice. This is 
exactly what Edgeworth does when he identifies the growth of RJ strategies as 
a manifestation, in the criminal sphere, of the advance of legal 
postmodernisation.83 He refers to RJ as a new paradigm of justice which, in true 
postmodern fashion, advocates both the elimination (or, at least, severe 
                                           
78 Van Ness & Strong (1997) 76. 
79 Van Ness & Strong (1997) 77. 
80 Van Ness & Strong (1997) 76-78. 
81 Toews & Zehr (2003) 261-264. 
82 See, for example, Zehr (1995) 15-18, Consedine (1999) 9-10 and Braithwaite (2003) 54-55. 
83 Edgeworth (2003) 155. 
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reduction) of state involvement in criminal justice, as well as the ample 
expansion of the sources of legal subjectivity to include non-legal 
considerations.84 The point is that between RJ and postmodernism there exists 
an objective intersection, the nature and ambit of which permit the properly 
reasonable inference that the former is indeed a species of the latter. 
5.1 The Political Economy of Postmodernism 
It remains to present a critical appreciation of RJ as the representative 
postmodern response to the contemporary crisis of criminality. In this regard, 
the first order of business is to engage the perceived newness of the 
postmodern epoch. Postmodernism is eponymously subversive. And 
postmodernists have a fondness for things unorthodox and imprudent. In the 
turbulent world of the early twenty-first century, postmodernists are self-
consciously on the cusp of a dystopian revolution in sensibilities. The ‚new 
times‛ in which we find ourselves are, on this account, also ‚postmodern 
times‛. 
It is submitted, however, that the supposed newness of these ‚postmodern 
times‛ conceals a fundamental continuity with ‚modern times‛ and, hence, 
that the confrontation with postmodern novelty must focus upon the elements 
of this continuity. Such a focus is not an attempt to avoid grappling with the 
newness of postmodernism. Rather, it is a choice which is intended to throw 
light upon the political economy of this newness. The interrogation of 
postmodernism must proceed from the historical and material context of its 
evolution. In this regard, the paramount feature of postmodernism is that it is 
grounded in the social relations of production of contemporary, that is, late 
capitalism. Thus, whereas the identification and demarcation of 
postmodernism must of necessity proceed from its newness, the critique of 
postmodernism must commence with the capitalist constants which underlie 
its newness. 
Notwithstanding its revolutionary posturings, postmodernism is a rather 
moderate phenomenon.85 It is a superstructural manifestation of the 
contemporary epoch of capitalism, which is one marked by explosive material 
contradictions. Postmodernism is the intellectual expression of the structural 
economic crisis which is ravaging the heartland of the capitalist mode of 
production. It is simultaneously the ideological pivot of the bourgeois 
                                           
84 Edgeworth (2003) 170. 
85 Wenger (1991 & 1994) established years ago already that postmodernism, as an 
expression of intellectual despair in the face of the structural crisis of late capitalism, is 
philosophically idealist. Idealism, of course, long has been the philosophical handmaiden 
of bourgeois hegemony. 
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endeavour to stay the threat of total collapse.86 Therefore, and despite its 
apparently historic newness, there is no cogent reason to analyse 
postmodernism as anything other than a superstructural effectivity of 
capitalism. 
What is more, there is no fundamental difference between modernity and 
postmodernity insofar as they are comprehended as eras of the capitalist mode 
of production. Postmodernism may represent an intellectual sea-change from 
modernism. But postmodernity is not as fundamentally different from 
modernity as to qualify as some sort of post-capitalist epoch. Postmodernity is, 
quite simply, the contemporary conjuncture of capitalism. And the essentials of 
the capitalist constitution remain unreconstructed. That is, capitalist social 
relations of production are still defined by the struggle between bourgeoisie 
and proletariat; labour-power remains the only true source of surplus value; 
the anarchy which marks all departments of capitalist production continues 
unabated; the capitalist property regime continues to be defined in 
individualist terms; and the bourgeois worldview remains fundamentally 
juridical.87 This catalogue of constants is by no means exhaustive. But it is 
comprehensive enough to convince that there is no basis upon which to 
comprehend postmodernity as anything other than an epoch - the current one - 
in the life and death of the capitalist mode of production. And while 
postmodernity is arguably the last epoch of the capitalist mode it is by no 
means the first of a post-capitalist mode. 
As an economy of generalised commodity production, capitalism has an 
inherent tendency to commodify social relations. The history of the capitalist 
mode of production is, in this connection, the history of the process of 
commodification. The commodity is the primordial expression of capitalist 
                                           
86 Following Harvey (1989) 173-197, the crisis is best comprehended as one of 
overaccumulation, requiring a flexible regime of accumulation to counteract the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
87 Engels (1990) 598 describes the juridical worldview as ‚the classical one of the 
bourgeoisie‛. It is the worldview which holds that law is the fundament of human 
affairs. It is the ideological expression of the political economy of the commodity. The 
predominantly theological world outlook of the pre-capitalist era was an obstacle to the 
free development of the commodity economy. It had to be replaced. The bourgeoisie 
found the juridical world outlook to be the most appropriate ideational expression of its 
class interests. Engels explains: ‚The economic and social relations, which people 
previously believed to have been created by the Church and its dogma – because 
sanctioned by the Church – were now seen as being founded on the law and created by 
the State.‛ The juridical worldview replaced church with state and religious dogma with 
law. It was, according to Engels, the theological worldview secularised. It enabled the 
bourgeoisie to present the commodification and sale of labour-power as transactions 
between legal equals. The economic exploitation and political oppression of the 
proletariat were secreted behind their juridical forms of equality and right. 
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property. The postmodern subject is a man or woman of property whose very 
existence is a personification of the organising principle of the commodity 
economy. Postmodernism has elevated commodification to heights unheard of 
in the evolution of capitalism. ‚Postmodernism is the consumption of sheer 
commodification as a process.‛88 And postmodernity is the unmitigated 
triumph of the commodity. It is the stage of capitalism in which ‚social reality 
is pervasively commodified‛.89 It is the era which is delineated by ‚the 
systematic commodification of everyday life‛.90 The dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie materialises as the dictatorship of the commodity. 
The acceleration of the process of commodification entails the extension of 
capitalist property relations into new areas of social life which, traditionally, 
have had no relation to the market. As the cultural countenance of 
contemporary capitalism, postmodernism operates as the medium of such 
commodification. However, the march of the commodity is not merely about 
the colonial-type conquest of areas of social existence hitherto unsullied by 
grubbing acquisitiveness. It is also, and arguably more importantly, about 
equalisation. In its pure form, divorced from diversionary encumbrances, 
commodification in the postmodern world reduces to the vindication and 
amplification of the principle of equivalence which governs the market in 
commodities91 and which lies at the heart of the juridical worldview. 
Essentially, the postmodern promotion of commodification is an exercise in the 
universalisation of the principle of equivalence which defines the capitalist 
exchange relation. It is the augmentation of the principle from its origins in 
commodity exchange to the exchanges of everyday life.92 Postmodernity is, in a 
                                           
88 Jameson (1988) x. 
89 Eagleton (1986) 133. 
90 Callinicos (1989) 151. 
91 The commodity is at the epicentre of life in the capitalist system. The commodity form 
concentrates in itself all the constitutive elements of capitalism as a mode of production. 
It stipulates equivalence as the governing principle of capitalist social relations of 
production. The legal form which accompanies the commodity form is nothing other 
than the equality postulate given the imprimatur of the capitalist state. The legal subject 
is the postulate made flesh. He exists first and foremost as a commodity owner. And as 
such, he has no superiors or subordinates, only equals. In the epoch of competitive 
capitalism, it was in the market in commodities that the principle of equivalence 
mattered most. The development of the free market depended upon all-round respect for 
and acquiescence in the principle. The epoch of late capitalism has seen the steady 
extension of the principle of equivalence into more and more of the non-economic facets 
of the social relations of production. In other words, there has been an increasing 
intrusion of the spirit of the commodity into more and more areas of human relations. 
92 See McVeigh (2002) 279: ‚Much of the work of postmodern theory in United States of 
America has disputed modern jurisprudence in the field of epistemology. It has been 
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word, the commodification of everything. It is the high-water mark of the 
fetishisation of the social relations of production. The absolute dominance of 
the commodity has transformed existence itself into a hyperreality of infinite 
simulacra.93 
It is tempting to take the accelerated commodification of the postmodern 
era as an index of the vitality of capitalism. That would be a mistake. By the 
time it entered its monopoly stage at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
capitalism was no longer a developing mode of production, and it has been 
degenerating ever since. Modernism was a response to this historic decline of 
capitalism. Postmodernism, too, is an expression of crisis, not of vitality.94 The 
postmodern intensification of commodification is, in this regard, part and 
parcel of the attempt to resolve the current capitalist crisis of 
overaccumulation95 by restructuring the regime of accumulation along more 
flexible lines.96 Flexibility requires a more expansive domain of accumulation 
opportunities. Hence the intrusion of the commodity form into areas of life 
traditionally not associated with the ethos of the market. Accelerated 
                                                                                                                           
concerned to work towards a jurisprudence that recognises, and respects, equality in 
difference.‛ 
93 This transformation assumed a phantasmagorical aspect in Baudrillard’s bizarre pre-war 
pronouncement that the Gulf War would not take place and his even more bizarre post-
war declaration that the Gulf War had not taken place. See Norris (1992) 15 who avers 
that postmodernism has rendered truth obsolete, ‚in so far as we have lost all sense of 
difference – the ontological or epistemological difference – between truth and the various 
true-seeming images, analogues and fantasy-substitutes which currently claim the title. 
So the Gulf War figures as one more example in Baudrillard’s extensive and varied 
catalogue of postmodern ‘hyperreality’. It is a conflict waged – for all that we can know – 
entirely at this level of strategic simulation, a mode of vicarious spectator-involvement 
that extends all the way from fictive war-games to saturation coverage of the ‘real-world’ 
event, and which thus leaves us perfectly incapable of distinguishing the one from the 
other.‛ 
94 See Davis (1988) 83 who observes that ‚the crucial point about contemporary capitalist 
structures of accumulation [is] that they are symptoms of global crisis, not signs of the 
triumph of capitalism’s irresistible drive to expand‛. 
95 See Harvey (1989) 180-181 who defines overaccumulation as ‚a condition in which idle 
capital and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no apparent way to bring 
these idle resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks‛. He continues: ‚A 
generalised condition of overaccumulation would be indicated by idle productive 
capacity, a glut of commodities and an excess of inventories, surplus money capital 
(perhaps held as hoards), and high unemployment.‛ 
96 According to Harvey (1989) 147, flexible accumulation ‚is marked by a direct 
confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism. It rests on flexibility with respect to labour 
processes, labour markets, products and patterns of consumption. It is characterised by 
the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial 
services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, 
technological and organisational innovation.‛ 
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commodification is thus a symptom of weakness, not of strength. It is a sign 
that capitalism is able no longer to countenance significant spheres of social 
relations outside the market in commodities. The contemporary imperatives of 
its reproduction as a mode of production demand that human existence be 
commodified as far and as fully as possible. Everything must become a 
potential source of capital accumulation. Flexible accumulation means absolute 
obeisance to that basic law of the commodity, the principle of equivalence. 
This is the context in which postmodernism becomes a celebration of 
equality. It is, in fact, equalisation untrammelled. Here the Lyotardian 
postmodern incredulity towards metanarratives may be apprehended as an 
incredulity towards the inequality inscribed in such metanarratives. The 
premodern narratives towards which postmodernism is especially partial are 
comprehended as perfect equals of one another and are understood to display 
none of the despotic propensities of the metanarrative. There is no grand 
narrative; there is only an infinite series of equally valid narratives. In other 
words, the repudiation of the metanarrative is simultaneously an assertion of 
the principle of equivalence. 
Postmodernism, then, professes an unqualified commitment to equality in 
all things. It is a commitment which is embedded in constitutive notions such 
as polycentrism, multi-perspectivism, destabilisation, anti-totalisation, 
decentredness and the like, all of which are variants of the hegemonic principle 
of equivalence, all of which repudiate hierarchy. In the postmodern world 
nothing is absolute except absolute relativism. Nothing is certain except that 
every point of view enjoys the same claim to validity as any other point of 
view. No discursive formation is prior to any other and no person is more 
valuable than any other. The postmodern subject is constituted in terms of the 
principle of equivalence. He lives and dies by the law of the commodity. 
The immersion of postmodernism in the culture of commodification 
necessarily implies that it subscribes to a worldview that is fundamentally 
juridical.97 The equality postulate which defines the postmodern moment also 
structures the juridical moment. The common factor is the commodity. In the 
evolution of exchange, to commodify is to juridify. This is why, despite its 
nihilistic excesses and random subversions, postmodernism is unequivocally 
wedded to the bourgeois, that is, the juridical worldview. Indeed, it is militant 
in its purveyance of this patently sectional worldview as the generalised 
worldview of all social classes; and it is radical in its advocacy of the principle 
                                           
97 See McVeigh (2002) 274: ‚The account presented here has emphasised that law has 
changed the means and objects of its regulation. Regulation through law no longer 
proceeds according to a principle of limited unity marked by distinctions between public 
and private spheres, State and civil society and so forth. Instead regulation proceeds 
according to a juridical saturation of social reality.‛ 
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of equivalence as the determining principle of all human interactions. This is 
why the postmodern era has witnessed the exponential intensification of the 
process of commodification. It is also why the equality postulate now reaches 
into areas which would have been off limits during the modern era. 
5.2 The Political Economy of Restorative Justice 
It is time to revert to the theory of RJ expounded by Christie. If, according to its 
self-image, RJ is to be comprehended as the negation of criminal justice and a 
crime is to be understood as a private legal transaction, then it is Christie’s 
notion of conflicts as property that continues to provide a theoretical 
springboard for the RJ project. In this sense, Christie’s proprietary theory of RJ 
is archetypal. Therefore, the remainder of this essay will be concerned to assess 
this theory, as an epistemological fundament of RJ, in relation to the central 
argument, that RJ is the exemplar of postmodern criminal justice. 
Although his theory does not rely expressly upon the discourse of 
equivalence, Christie does show a strong intuitive grasp of the place of the 
process of commodification in the constitution of the legal form. Christie is 
concerned with criminal justice in ‚industrialised large-scale society‛.98 It is, of 
course, an analytical truism that ‚industrialised large-scale society‛ is more or 
less coincident with capitalism, a mode of production delineated by 
generalised commodity production and structured by class conflict. In other 
words, Christie is concerned with capitalist criminal justice. And he agitates for 
crimes in capitalist society to be redefined as forms of property. Since 
capitalism is a society of generalised commodity production governed by the 
legal regime of private property, it follows that Christie’s argument that 
criminal conflicts be comprehended as property forms is, upon examination, an 
argument for their commodification.99 In ‚industrialised large-scale society‛ 
property is perforce a commodity, and the broadening of the ambit of property 
is perforce an extension of the domain of the commodity. In this context, to 
privatise the criminal episode is to commodify it. 
Christie’s proprietary thesis, then, turns upon the process of 
commodification as its central theoretical premise. He is proposing, in effect, 
that RJ be theorised in terms of the extension of the process of commodification 
to criminal behaviour itself. In other words, every criminal episode is, or must 
become, a commodity. Christie’s work is primarily about grounding RJ 
theoretically, and in his elaboration of a theory of RJ he grasps the basic truth 
that legal relations are the superstructural manifestation of commodity 
                                           
98 Christie (1977) 1. 
99 See Pashukanis (1978) 126: ‚Private property first becomes perfected and universal with 
the transition to commodity production, or more accurately, to capitalist commodity 
production.‛ 
186         RAYMOND KOEN 
 
relations, and that the legal form is, at bottom, a proprietary form which is 
suffused with the ethos of the market. Christie’s thesis is more or less 
universally accepted as an unsurpassed theory of RJ, and rightly so. Certainly, 
it may be asserted with confidence that not a single proponent of RJ has taken 
issue with Christie. But it may be asserted with equal confidence that the true 
import of the Christie theory rarely, if ever, has been engaged and excavated by 
its adherents. 
Christie’s real achievement is that he grasped the fundamentals of the 
political economy of RJ. He discerned that the crisis of criminality had its 
material basis in the crisis of capitalism and fashioned a theory which 
comprehended the pivotal position occupied by proprietary relations in the 
social relations of production of capitalism.100 When Christie conceptualises a 
crime as a form of property, he is commodifying it. He appreciates the 
proprietary bias of contemporary capitalist society and celebrates it as the 
cornerstone of the theory of RJ. However, this celebration is also his major 
weakness, for it fails to engage the singular fact that capitalist society is 
historically decadent and that RJ is a product of this decadence. 
The material roots of the RJ movement are to be found in the economic 
crisis which has ravaged the capitalist world, more or less unabated, for the 
past four decades at least. The severity and depth of the crisis have spawned 
the neo-liberal drive to unburden the state of the social and welfare 
responsibilities which it had to assume after the Second World War. 
Privatisation is the watchword of this project, and is touted as the answer to 
public waste and bureaucratic inefficiency which apparently underlie the crisis 
of capitalist profitability. The neo-liberal project is supposedly about 
rejuvenating the free market, unencumbered by the ‚dead hand‛ of public 
claims and responsibilities. Its proponents argue that private enterprise will 
achieve the levels of profitability and general prosperity which hitherto have 
evaded those who make public policy. The state and its agencies are perceived 
as impediments to the blossoming of the free enterprise system. Hence the neo-
liberal credo that the state ought to step aside and leave the business of the 
economy to those who have their lives invested in making it functional.101 
These are not salaried state officials, for whom economic concerns are little 
                                           
100 It may be noted here that Christie’s idea of criminal conflict as property is a quite 
stunning vindication of the analysis of the legal form proposed by the Marxist jurist 
Evgeny Pahuskanis during the Bolshevik years of the Russian Revolution. In Christie we 
see a respected member of the non-Marxist criminological community proffering an 
analysis of crime and punishment which is spontaneously but uncannily Pashukanian in 
its essentials. See Koen (2103) for an extended exploration of the relationship between 
Pashukanis and Christie regarding RJ. 
101 Pavlich (2005) 6-7. 
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more than an item in a job description, but the entrepreneurs for whom the 
health of the economy and the stability of the social order are absolutely vital. 
In other words, from the neo-liberal perspective it is the private sector, not the 
public, which holds the key to the solution of the structural crisis of capitalism 
and its expanded reproduction as a mode of production. 
The neo-liberals found ideological justification for their project in the notion 
of popular capitalism. They sought to obfuscate the class character of 
privatisation by re-presenting capitalism as a people’s mode of production.102 
The precepts of popular capitalism were formulated with a view to giving all 
citizens a material stake in the mode of production, that is, to create a 
‚stakeholder society‛, or at least the illusion thereof.103 Ordinary working 
people were assured by capitalist ideologues that they too could enjoy a slice of 
the profit pie and were lured by opportunities to invest in the economies of 
their countries via the equity market. The idea was to free the economy from 
state interference and control, and thereby to prove that capitalism was a 
dynamic system which could bring good fortune to all who embraced its 
methods and mores.104 Capitalism was no longer only for the capitalists. It was 
for everybody. It was a people's mode of production, and all people could 
profit by investing in it. Welfare capitalism had enabled the state, which had 
now become a hindrance to capitalist progress. Popular capitalism wished to 
liberate the market from the strictures of state control. The free market was the 
key to prosperity. The wider the process of commodification, the more 
opportunity there would be for avoiding crises and promoting growth. Hence 
                                           
102 The idea of popular capitalism does suggest a certain ‚publicness‛. However, it is a 
dimension which is entirely subsumed under the popular capitalist drive towards 
privatisation. 
103 Here it is worth noting that RJ advocates habitually refer to the persons for whom they 
aspire to obtain justice as ‚stakeholders‛, a term heavy with proprietary overtones. The 
collection edited by Zehr & Toews (2004), for example, devotes more than a hundred of 
its 400-odd pages to what are called ‚stakeholder issues‛. This trend appears to be 
derived from the popular capitalist idea of a ‚stakeholder society‛, in the success of 
which everyone is supposed to have a proprietary interest. 
104 For a detailed exposition of the tenets of popular capitalism see Redwood (1989) 24-45. 
The primary target of the popular capitalist ideologue was the state. It was argued that 
capitalism was in trouble because of too much state interference in its operations. The 
problem with capitalism was, according to the popular capitalists, not structural but 
conjunctural, deriving from the overbearing presence of the state in affairs which ought 
to be private. The state was an undesirable interloper and had to be expelled from the 
relations between private commodity owners. The key to prosperity was not in class 
solidarity but in individual achievement. The possibility of a better life lay in a private, 
not a social, future. Such were the pledges of popular capitalism: it was not an elitist 
system; it could uplift the masses. 
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privatisation. Hence the celebration of the market as the great leveller. Hence 
the enthusiasm for entrepreneurship and free enterprise.105 
RJ may be comprehended as the penological correlate of the neo-liberal 
economic vision and the ideology of popular capitalism. There is an almost 
palpable correspondence between the crisis of profitability and accumulation 
besetting the economy and the crisis of criminality and penality besetting the 
administration of justice. RJ represents the incursion of the spirit of the market 
into the arena of criminal conflict. Whereas this arena has been an eminently 
statist one hitherto, the advocates of RJ have taken an expressly anti-statist 
position. For them, RJ is a sphere of privatised justice in which the state has no 
place. They view the criminal justice system as a state asset which needs to be 
privatised, like so many other state assets which have been privatised already. 
Privatisation is necessary because the state has been unable to administer the 
criminal justice system ‚profitably‛, and has earned but minimal returns upon 
its investments on the anti-crime bourse. 
The RJ argument is that the state has failed in its bid to solve or even 
manage the crisis of criminality which continues to run amok in most capitalist 
social formations, and now needs to hand it over to those who can. In this 
regard, RJ seeks to bring to criminal justice a remedy of the order which neo-
liberalism purportedly has brought to the economy. A crucial feature of this 
remedy is the transfer of hitherto public assets to the private sector, and the 
import of the principles of the market into existing state institutions. Adherents 
of RJ seek to sever the link between the state and criminal justice. They wish to 
remove criminal conflicts from the public sphere and reconstruct them 
according to the precepts of the private sector. They are convinced, more or 
less, that it is the entrepreneurial spirit which holds the answer to the world-
wide crisis of criminality. They are the free-marketeers of the criminal justice 
system. 
The RJ antagonism to statist criminal justice is a radical one. Comprehensive 
RJ is the first and only criminological movement to advocate that the state be 
ejected entirely from the criminal justice process. However, it is a localised 
radicality. It is concerned to re-organise the manner in which capitalist society 
deals with crime. It proposes that such re-organisation be founded upon the 
                                           
105 Of course, popular capitalism meant serious cutbacks in the hard-won social rights of the 
workers. But, they were told, every worker now had the right to break free of a life of 
dependence upon and charity from the state, and to discover his true worth in the heady 
atmosphere of the free market. Popular capitalism was proffered by its ideologues as the 
solution to the structural crisis of and proletarian disaffection with the mode of 
production. It promised to sideline the class struggle and to transform every citizen into 
a property owner, motivated by the ideals of individual incentive and self-promotion, 
and dedicated to making capitalism work. Popular capitalism was, in this regard, an 
attempt to replace classes with consumers. See Mawby & Walklate (1994) 80-86. 
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privatisation of criminal justice, which, in terms of the proprietary approach 
pioneered by Christie, entails the extension of the process of commodification 
to the criminal conflict itself. In other words, RJ appropriates the defining form 
and process of the capitalist economy as its theoretical touchstone. Thereby it 
classifies itself as a bourgeois theory of criminal justice. 
6 Conclusion 
It should be evident from the preceding presentation that the political 
economies of postmodernism and RJ are coterminous in many respects. In 
particular, its commodification of the criminal episode, which is entrained in 
Christie’s comprehension of criminal conflicts as property, locates RJ squarely 
within the compass of postmodernism. The latter, it will be recalled, represents 
the high-water mark in capitalist culture of the process of commodification and 
thereby of the principle of equivalence upon which commodification rests. If 
the idea of popular capitalism was part of an ideological response of the ruling 
class to the economic crisis of the mode of production, then the idea of 
postmodernism represents the ethos of popular capitalism extended to the 
superstructure as a whole. 
RJ is the criminal justice of postmodernity. It is the postmodern moment in 
the evolution of the criminal justice system. The objective affinity between 
postmodernism and RJ is unmistakeable. They have the same material and 
historical origins in the long-term decline of the capitalist mode of production. 
Like postmodernism, RJ understands the world in juridical terms. Both are 
structured by the core juridical principle of equivalence, which is embraced as 
the organising axis of social relations. Both comprehend the legal form in 
relation to the commodity form. And they both take commodification to new 
heights in their respective fields of influence. The restorative ‚stakeholder‛ in a 
criminal conflict is the analogue of the postmodern consumer. Postmodernism 
commodifies everyday life relentlessly. RJ commodifies the criminal conflicts 
which have become a relentless fixture of everyday life. If postmodernism 
demarcates the general configuration of the superstructure of late capitalism, 
then RJ is postmodernism expressed in legal superstructural terms. It is the 
commodified character of postmodernism which structures the proprietary 
character of RJ. RJ is postmodernism writ small. 
However, it is precisely the postmodern nature of RJ which stands as an 
impassable barrier to its success. The proponents of RJ may be true radicals in 
their rejection of a state-sponsored criminal justice and their agitation for a 
privatised RJ. However, they turn out to be true conservatives about the notion 
of the juridical which underlies both criminal justice and RJ. The devotees of RJ 
relate to criminal justice in the same way that anarchists relate to bourgeois 
law: they reject its external characteristics while preserving ‚its inner essence, 
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the free contract between autonomous producers‛.106 Insofar, therefore, as its 
opposition to the state is a parochial one which never ventures outside the 
conceptual confines of the bourgeois worldview, the radicality of RJ is 
overwritten in reaction. The RJ demand for the demise of criminal justice is 
simultaneously a vote of confidence in the perpetuity of the commodity form 
and its homologous legal form. 
Even within the parameters of the juridical, the radicality of RJ soon runs 
aground upon the tenacity with which the state holds its position in the 
criminal justice system. There is here a debilitating contradiction between the 
theoretical premise of RJ and the nature of capitalist criminal justice, a 
contradiction which has the effect of undoing the former. For it is a vain hope 
that, within the confines of the social relations of the capitalist mode of 
production, it is possible to construct a response to the problem of crime which 
does not rely upon state participation. Christie and his adherents do not 
understand that capitalist criminal justice is necessarily state justice. The neo-
liberal project may encourage the privatisation of policing and corrections. But 
crime and its punishment are off limits. Even in the world of popular 
capitalism, they must remain public functions. They must retain their statist 
fundamentals. 
The regime of criminal justice as we know it is a thoroughly juridical 
regime, in the sense that it is dedicated to the principle of equivalence which 
defines the legal form. However, since every crime is a negation of this 
principle, the entry of the state as party to every criminal matter is simply 
necessary to ensure that the principle is upheld. The neo-liberal assault upon its 
hegemony notwithstanding, the capitalist state cannot and will not allow itself 
to be ejected from a system which is predicated upon its involvement. 
Capitalism, however popular, contains no space for the transformation of 
criminal justice into RJ. When all is said and done, RJ will not supplant criminal 
justice. The social relations of production themselves constitute an 
insurmountable impediment. The radicality of RJ dissipates in the face of 
bourgeois class power. And the desideratum of comprehensive RJ ceases to be 
a viable alternative to criminal justice. Instead, it is broken up into so many 
discrete pieces, each operational only at the behest and under the auspices of 
the capitalist state and its criminal justice system, but never combining into a RJ 
system. The only future for RJ within the parameters of capitalism is a partial 
one. 
That, then, is the essential difficulty facing RJ: the very material conditions 
which engendered it also conspire to prevent it attaining its goal. RJ is 
postmodern justice. But the material constitution of postmodernity militates 
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against the ultimate success of RJ over criminal justice. The triumph of RJ 
requires nothing less than a post-legal and, hence, a post-capitalist world, 
which has transcended the parameters of postmodernism. Absent such a 
transformation, RJ stands in jeopardy of being despatched, along with 
postmodernism, to the rubbish heap of historical curiosities. 
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